

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

Briefing Material of 14 November -  
Executive Committee Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC  
REVIEW  
COMPLETE

November 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM ON LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR CUBA.

It is my belief that a Castro-Soviet Communist Cuba, whose stated intentions and past actions are to support and spread subversion throughout Latin America, is unacceptable to the United States and should be unacceptable to most, if not all, Latin American states.

It can be said that through the removal of the missiles (and we must assume but do not know positively that all are removed) and the removal of the IL 28s (if this can be negotiated) the threat to the security of the United States and the Latin American states from a nuclear strike is removed. However, two serious problems remain:

One, no means have been established to reasonably guarantee that offensive missiles will not be reintroduced or, if offensive missiles remain on the island, that they will not be secretly placed in operational status. Aerial surveillance will help, but will not guarantee our ability to detect such an activity. Ground inspection would if properly organized and granted freedom of movement. But this has been denied by Castro and the denial is now supported by Mikoyan.

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Furthermore, the SAM sites if operating can effectively deny aerial inspection. There can be no explanation for Soviet insistence on leaving the SAM sites except to shield future clandestine implantation of offensive weapons such as MRBMs and IRBMs if the Soviets choose at some future time to reintroduce these weapons systems.

Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equipment far in excess of his needs.

A combination of aerial inspection and properly organized ground inspection would give an effective guarantee against re-introduction of missile systems. The ground inspectors would have to have freedom of action so that they could make on-site checks of the ever increasing refugee and agent reports of the storing of missiles and their equipments in caves which can not be totally dismissed.

Therefore prior to a "no invasion" commitment we must have complete arrangements for inspections and they cannot be frustrated by either the Soviets or Castro.

Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equipment. He also now has ~~xxx~~ amphibious equipment capable of supporting insurgency movements against any of the Caribbean, Central American states or states in the northern tier of South America. Castro has

never changed in his determined effort to subvert these states. He has trained insurgents by the thousands; there are large numbers, <sup>Propaganda ( ) radios and press is</sup> they are in Cuba now in training. His ~~insurgents~~ are directed against a number of Central and South American states. He repeatedly expresses violent intentions against the ~~organized~~ organized governments of these states. Therefore one can only conclude that he would use his newly acquired amphibious lift and a substantial part of his excess arms to support insurgents who can readily overthrow neighboring governments. Our policy should anticipate this and should be ~~designed~~ designed to take action regardless of how extreme to remove this threat if the eventualities mentioned above materialize.

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Courses of Action Open to U. S. in Cuban Situation

A/ If USSR agrees to remove IL-28s, U. S. will

- 1) lift quarantine and terminate 10/23 proclamation;
- 2) continue air surveillance - without further announcement - in part to guard against possibility that some offensive weapons remain in Cuba;
- 3) withhold registering with SC-UN declaration confirming U. S. assurance against invasion of Cuba until agreement has been reached on "suitable safeguards" in support of Soviet undertaking to halt further introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Such safeguards should include some international "presence" in Cuba - UN, OAS or Caribbean Peace Commission - and should include some reciprocal features - such as inspection of suspected refugee training areas in Central America - as a basis for gaining Castro's consent. The latter might also be obtained as part of the Latin America nuclear-free zone proposal.

B/ If USSR refuses to remove IL-28s, U. S will

- 1) continue limited quarantine by boarding, as well as intercepting and hauling all ships enroute to Cuba, applying such procedures first to Free World non-Soviet charter ships, next to Free World ships on charter to Soviet, then to Bloc ships and finally to Soviet ships;
- 2) continue air surveillance with announcement as to its necessity dictated by absence of on-site verification of offensive weapons removal and presence of IL-28 bomber threat;
- 3) treat assurance against invasion of Cuba in President's letter of October 27th as not in effect because of non-performance by Soviet.

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